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The unequal effects of liberalization: evidence from dismantling
the License Raj in India
Abstract
We study whether the effects on registered manufacturing output of dismantling the License Raj — a
system of central controls regulating entry and production activity in this sector — vary across Indian
states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal across Indian states
with different labor market regulations. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states
with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments.
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In the postwar period, planned industrialization became a widespread development strategy 
for tackling economic backwardness. In the 1980s, however, amidst growing dissatisfaction 
about its results, many developing countries progressively liberalized their economies by dis-
mantling government controls over industry and opening up to trade. Despite the pervasiveness 
of these reforms, there is little sound empirical evidence on whether and how they interact with 
local institutions. The same nationwide reform could lead to quite different outcomes, depending 
on the local institutional environment.
The aim of this paper is to examine the interaction between product market deregulation and 
the organization of labor markets in India. We focus on a little-studied internal liberalization 
episode, the dismantling during the 1980s and 1990s of the License Raj—a system of central 
controls introduced in 1951 regulating entry and production activity in the registered manufac-
turing sector. Delicensing reforms were staggered over a decade, but were nationwide in scope: 
when an industry was delicensed, the policy change affected all Indian firms in that industry, 
irrespective of location. The focus of our analysis is on whether institutional differences across 
Indian states, particularly in labor market regulations, led to a differential response in industrial 
performance to the reform across states.
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Our main finding is that, after delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor 
market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments. This result stands 
up to a wide variety of robustness checks. Since pro-worker regulations are, on average, associ-
ated with weaker industrial performance, our study shows that dropping barriers to investment 
and entry via delicensing magnified the disadvantage of states with pro-worker labor market 
institutions.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, a number of recent papers argue that the 
impact of pro-competitive reforms on economic performance will vary significantly depending 
on the technological and institutional environment in which they take place (Aghion et al. 2005; 
Daron Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2006).1 Second, there is a literature that studies the 
effect of labor or entry regulation on economic performance (Thomas Holmes 1998; Marianne 
Bertrand and Francis Kramarz 2002; Simeon Djankov et al. 2002; Timothy Besley and Burgess 
2004; Ricardo J. Caballero et al. 2004; Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow 2007). Finally, a 
recent literature analyzes the interaction between product market and labor market regulations 
(Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 2003; Alejandro Cunat and Melitz 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides the relevant historical background and 
describes how the different data series are constructed. Section II contains the empirical analy-
sis of the links between delicensing, labor regulation environment, and industrial performance. 
Section III concludes.
I.  Background and Data
The centerpiece of centrally planned industrialization in India was the Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act of 1951 which brought all key industries in the registered manufacturing 
sector under central government control via industrial licensing. Under the act, an industrial 
license was required to establish a new factory, significantly expand capacity, start a new product 
line, or change location (see Rabindra K. Hazari 1966; Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai 1970; 
P. L. Malik 1997). This allowed the government to allocate plan production targets to firms. We 
use statements on industrial policy, press notes, and notifications issued by the federal govern-
ment to code when different three-digit industries were exempted from industrial licensing.2
During the 1980s and the 1990s, there were two main waves of reforms. The first occurred 
in 1985 after Rajiv Gandhi’s unexpected rise to power following the assassination of his mother 
Indira in 1984. He was an airline pilot with no political experience whose reformist attitude was 
largely unexpected (Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian 2004). It was under his government, 
in 1985, that around one-third of all three-digit industries were delicensed. The second wave of 
reform was launched in 1991 under the regime of Narasimha Rao, who came to power following 
Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in an election campaign that subsequently returned the Congress 
Party to government. The 1991 liberalization was prompted by a balance-of-payment crisis and 
by the external pressure of the IMF that imposed a structural adjustment program. Industrial 
licensing was effectively abolished in 1991, except for a small number of industries where it was 
retained “for reasons related to security and strategic concerns, social reasons, problems related 
1 In a similar spirit, the recent trade literature has studied how heterogeneous firms and industries react differently 
to trade liberalization (James Tybout, Jaime de Melo, and Vittorio Corbo 1991; Nina Pavcnik 2002; Marc Melitz 2003; 
Daniel Trefler 2004; Andrew Bernard, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott 2007; Eric Verhoogen 2008).
2 See Table 1 for summary statistics of the main variables and the Data Appendix for further information on vari-
able definitions and data sources. Figure A1 of the online Appendix, available at the American Economic Review’s 
Web site (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.4.1398), displays when each three-digit industry was 
delicensed. Table A1 provides the detail on how each three-digit industry was coded and Table A2 provides the concor-
dance between the 1970 and 1987 industrial classification systems.
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to safety and overriding environmental issues, manufacture of products of hazardous nature 
and articles of elitist consumption” (Government of India 1991). As with the case of Gandhi, the 
depth of the reformist tendencies of the Rao government was largely unanticipated. There are 
few instances of delicensing in years other than the leadership transitions in 1985 and 1991.3
From 1991 onward, tariff barriers were also progressively reduced and restrictions on for-
eign direct investment (FDI) relaxed (Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra 1998; Petia Topalova 
2005). It is therefore important for us to separate the effects of delicensing from those of trade 
and FDI liberalization. To capture trade liberalization, we construct a measure of the actual tar-
iff rate applied by customs officials at the Indian border by combining basic, auxiliary, and coun-
tervailing rates of duty for each three-digit industry between 1980 and 1997. These provide us 
with a direct measure of the evolving Indian trade policy regime and enable us to control for the 
effects of trade liberalization in our regressions. To capture FDI liberalization, we record, from 
1991 onward, how many six-digit products within a three-digit industry were opened to auto-
matic approval of FDI (up to 51 percent equity). Our measure takes a value of zero before 1991 
when FDI was strictly controlled. In Table 1 we see that our applied tariff is high and relatively 
flat across the 1980–1990 period and then falls dramatically after 1990. The FDI reform measure 
increases after 1990 following the relaxation of controls on foreign investment.
We match our delicense, tariff, and FDI reform measures with state-industry panel data on 
the registered manufacturing sector for the period 1980–1997 drawn from the Annual Survey 
of Industries.4 This is the most disaggregated level at which one can obtain representative data 
on industrial performance across the pre- and post-delicensing periods. The sampling unit is 
a state and three-digit industry pair, so that the data are representative at the state-three-digit 
industry level. To minimize the role played by industry entry and exit in explaining our results, 
we restrict our attention to a balanced panel of state-industries on which data exist for all 18 
years of our dataset. Moreover, since we are interested in comparing cross-state, within-industry 
performance, we restrict attention to industries that exist in at least five states in each year of 
the sample. This gives us 18,324 observations on an average of 64 three-digit industries in each 
of the 16 main Indian states over an 18-year time period.5 These 16 states account for over 95 
percent of the Indian population.
As India is a federal democracy and industrial relations fall under the joint jurisdiction of 
central and state governments in the Indian constitution, labor market regulations differ across 
states. The key piece of central legislation is the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, which sets 
out the conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication procedures to be followed in the case of an 
industrial dispute. This act has been extensively amended by state governments during the post-
Independence period. Thus, although all states have the same starting point, they have diverged 
from one another over time. Following Besley and Burgess (2004), we code each state amend-
ment as neutral (0), pro-worker (11), or pro-employer (21). Having obtained the net direction of 
amendments in any given year, we cumulate the scores over time to give a quantitative picture of 
how the regulatory environment evolved over the 1947–1997 period.
3 The 1985 and 1991 reforms covered, respectively, around one-third and one-half of three-digit industries. About 
one-tenth of three-digit industries had not been delicensed by 1997 (see Figure A1 of the online Appendix).
4 Under the Factories Act of 1948, enterprises are required to register if either they have more than 10 employees and 
electric power or have more than 20 employees and no electric power. Smaller enterprises below these size thresholds 
are classified as part of unregistered manufacturing and are not covered by the Annual Survey of Industries. In our 
sample period, registered manufacturing makes up about 9 percent of total state output and unregistered manufacturing 
around 5 percent.
5 We check that all our results are robust to running regressions on an unbalanced panel where industries are in the 
data for at least ten years and are active in at least five states. This raises our sample size to 24,374 observations.
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There is heterogeneity in both the level and change of labor regulation across our 1980–1997 
sample period. The most extreme pro-worker state, West Bengal, has labor regulation values that 
rise from 12 to 14 over the 1980–1997 period. Three other states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, and 
Orissa) are also recorded as beginning the period as pro-worker or amending in this direction. 
The most extreme pro-employer state, Andhra Pradesh, has a score that varies from 22 to 23 
across our period. Four other states (Kerala, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka) begin the 
period as pro-employer or amend in that direction. There are six neutral states (Assam, Bihar, 
Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh) that begin the period at zero and do 
not amend in either direction. Finally, Madhya Pradesh is neutral in all years except for a pro-
employer change in 1982, which is reversed by a 1983 pro-worker amendment.6
Labor regulations, industrial licensing, and the Annual Survey of Industries apply only to 
registered manufacturing. Our data are therefore well suited to examine how product market 
6  Figure A2 in the online Appendix displays the variation in state labor regulation across the 1980–1997 sample 
period.
Table 1—Sample Descriptive Statistics
1980 1985 1990 1997 1980–1997
Delicensing
Percentage of three-digit industries delicensed 0 36.61 39.29 91.07 73.48
Percentage of real output delicensed 0 47.68 56.94 92.57 74.53
Percentage of employment delicensed 0 43.05 47.81 88.15 68.31
Labor regulation
Labor regulation 20.16 20.05 0.13 0.13 0.0411.042 11.422 11.652 11.652 11.522
Trade liberalization
Tariff rate 119.19 142.31 132.53 47.58 117.62144.742 147.692 138.942 121.342 149.222
fDI reform
FDI reform 0 0 0 0.35 0.1410.392 10.302
Industrial performance
Mean log real output 11.47 11.88 12.31 12.68 12.1311.962 11.932 11.962 12.202 12.022
Mean log number of factories 3.30 3.42 3.50 3.58 3.4611.342 11.292 11.302 11.362 11.322
Mean log employment 7.22 7.37 7.46 7.55 7.4311.702 11.572 11.582 11.692 11.612
Mean log real fixed capital 9.78 10.39 10.74 11.27 10.6112.122 12.032 12.122 12.462 12.202
Observations    1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 18,324
Notes: The dataset is a balanced panel of three-digit state industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and 
includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard deviations across state industries. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded (1 5 pro-
worker, 0 5 neutral, 21 5 pro-employer) and then cumulated over the 194721997 period to generate the labor regu-
lation measure. Tariff rate is the tariff rate applied to a three-digit registered manufacturing industry. FDI reform is 
a variable, which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the fraction of Harmonized System six-digit 
products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of FDI for up to 51 percent equity. Real output is 
real registered manufacturing output in thousands of rupees 11981 prices 2 . Number of factories is number of registered 
manufacturing factories. Employment is number of registered manufacturing employees. Real fixed capital is real reg-
istered manufacturing fixed capital stock in thousands of rupees 11981 prices 2 . See the Data Appendix for further infor-
mation on variable definitions and the data sources.
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deregulation, in the form of delicensing, interacts with heterogeneous state-level labor institu-
tions in shaping the pattern of industrial development across Indian states.
II.  Empirical Analysis
A. Method
Our interest centers on the delicense–labor regulation interaction coefficient which captures 
the role of state-specific labor regulation in mediating the impact of the delicensing reform on 
industrial performance. To examine this interaction, we estimate a regression of the form:
(1)  yi, s, t 5 ai, s 1 hi, t 1 bs, t 1 u 1di, t 2 1rs, t 2 1 ei, s, t ,
where yi, s, t is the logarithm of three-digit state-industry real output, di, t is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of unity in the year a three-digit industry is delicensed and then stays equal 
to one thereafter, rs, t is the labor regulation measure for state s at time t, ai, s are state-industry 
interactions that control for any unobserved time-invariant determinants of state-industry per-
formance (e.g., natural endowments, location), hi, t are industry-year interactions that control for 
differential industry-specific time effects (e.g., technological innovation), bs, t are state-year inter-
actions that control for differential state-specific time effects (e.g., macro shocks), and ei, s, t is a 
stochastic error. The coefficient of interest (u) is identified by the mix of industry-year variation 
in delicensing interacted with state-year variation in labor regulation.
We cluster the standard errors by state and year of delicensing. This is not only to address 
serial correlation concerns (and to allow for heteroskedasticity), but also to take account of the 
fact that delicensing is highly clustered in time. Delicensing happened overwhelmingly in 1985 
and 1991, implying that different industries within a state in these years cannot be treated as 
independent observations.
B. Results
If the licensing system was acting as a barrier to entry, we would expect its removal to be asso-
ciated with an increase in entry in delicensed relative to still-licensed industries. The inclusion of 
industry-year and state-year interactions in equation (1) precludes estimating the average effects 
of delicense and labor regulation, as these vary at the industry-year and state-year level, respec-
tively. We therefore begin our analysis by presenting, in Table 2, results for a specification where 
the industry-year and state-year interactions in equation (1) have been replaced with year fixed 
effects and where the delicense–labor regulation interaction term has also been omitted. In col-
umn 1, we find that delicensing leads to a statistically significant increase in the number of fac-
tories within an industry of around 6 percent.7 The delicensing reform therefore does appear to 
have encouraged entry. In column 2, we include labor regulation as an additional regressor. The 
coefficient on labor regulation is negative and significant, indicating that states that have moved 
in a pro-worker direction experience less net entry relative to pro-employer states. The coeffi-
cient on delicense remains positive and significant, and of a similar magnitude. Delicensing and 
pro-worker labor regulation are thus pulling in opposite directions in determining the number of 
factories operating in state industries.
7 Unfortunately, we do not observe separate entry and exit flows, but changes in the number of factories operating in 
a state-industry provide us with a measure of net entry.
SEPTEMBER 20081402 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Columns 3 and 4 use the same specification to examine the average effects of delicensing 
and labor regulation on output. In column 3, we find a positive, but not statistically significant, 
effect of delicensing. The small average effect on output, however, may be masking substantial 
heterogeneity of delicensing effects, depending on the institutional conditions in Indian states. 
Output may have risen in some states and fallen in other states in response to the same nation-
wide delicensing reform. To examine this possibility, we added interactions between state fixed 
effects and delicense to the specification in column 3 of Table 2. We find that the coefficient on 
this interaction is positive in nine states and negative in seven states: delicensing led to a rise 
in output in some states and a fall in output in other states (relative to industries where licens-
ing was retained).8 We also find a similar pattern of effects for employment and fixed capital: 
the average effect of delicensing is small and insignificant but hides considerable heterogeneity 
across states.
A key question concerns which characteristics of states affect how industries located within 
their borders respond to delicensing. Of particular interest are policies and institutions over 
which state governments exercise some control. In column 4 of Table 2, we find that regulation in 
a pro-worker direction is associated with lowered output relative to regulating in a pro-employer 
direction. This lines up with a growing body of evidence that suggests that labor regulation 
affects industrial performance across Indian states.9
In this paper we examine whether state-specific labor institutions mediated the impact of 
the nationwide delicensing reform on industrial performance across Indian states. Column 1 
of Table 3 presents results from estimating a regression of the form described in equation (1). 
The delicense–labor regulation interaction coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that, 
8 Eleven of the sixteen delicense-state interactions are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. We can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on delicense is the same across states at the 1 percent level. 
In the interest of brevity we do not report the individual coefficients on the delicense-state interactions.
9 Besley and Burgess (2004) show that states that amended in a pro-worker direction in the pre-1992 period expe-
rienced lowered output, employment, investment, and productivity in registered manufacturing. In contrast, output 
in unregistered manufacturing increased. Labor regulation therefore seems to be capturing something specific to the 
institutional environment facing firms in registered manufacturing. Unfortunately, data on unregistered manufacturing 
are not available at the state-industry level across our sample period.
Table 2—Average Effects of Delicensing on Industrial Performance in India: 1980–1997112 122 132 142
Log no. factories Log no. factories Log real output Log real output
Delicense 0.064*** 0.064** 0.032 0.03110.0242 10.0242 10.0422 10.0432
Labor regulation 20.062** 20.137***10.0272 10.0442
Observations 18,324 18,324 18,324 18,324
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89
State-industry interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dataset is a balanced panel of three-digit state industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and 
includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on state 3 year delicensed are reported in parentheses. Log no. factories is log number of reg-
istered manufacturing factories. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy 
variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year, and zero otherwise. State 
amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded (1 5 pro-worker, 0 5 neutral, 21 5 pro-employer) and then 
cumulated over the 1947–1997 period to generate the labor regulation measure. See the Data Appendix for further 
information on variable definitions and the data sources.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
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when delicensing occurred, industries in states with pro-employer regulation experienced larger 
increases in output relative to those located in pro-worker states.10 This is the key result in the 
paper. Given the demanding nature of the specification, this is compelling evidence that labor 
regulations passed over time at the state level affected how industries responded to a nationwide 
delicensing experiment.11
We checked that our findings are not driven by individual states by sequentially excluding 
each state from the sample and reestimating the column 1 specification of Table 3. In each 
case, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between delicense and labor regulation 
remains significant at the 5 percent level and is not statistically significantly different from the 
estimate for the full sample. This suggests that our results capture a general relationship between 
industrial performance, delicensing, and labor market institutions, rather than the influence of 
individual states.
10 We find a similar result for a specification that includes state-industry interactions and year fixed effects (see 
column 1 of Table A3 in the online Appendix). The delicense–labor regulation coefficient (standard error) is –0.070 
(0.018).
11 A model developed in the working paper version of the paper helps us to understand this key result. Delicensing 
encourages firm entry and expansion, but more so in pro-employer states. The falls in price that ensue lead to exit and 
contraction of less productive firms, particularly in pro-worker states. The net effect is a reallocation of economic activ-
ity toward pro-employer states (see Aghion et al. 2006).
Table 3—Delicensing, Labor Regulation, and Industrial Performance in India: 1980–1997112 122 132 142
Log real output Log real output Log real output Log real output
Delicense 3 labor regulation 20.054** 20.202**10.0242 10.0782
Delicense 3 1980 labor regulation 20.062*10.0352
Delicense 3 instrumented labor regulation 20.068**10.0302
Observations 18,324 18,324 18,054 18,324
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
State-industry interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delicense-state interactions Yes
Notes: The dataset is a balanced panel of three-digit state industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and 
includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. The difference in the num-
ber of observations between column 3 and the other columns of the table is due to the absence of unionization data 
for Jammu and Kashmir, which implies that instrumented labor regulation is missing for Jammu and Kashmir. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by state 3 year delicensed are reported in parentheses. Log real output is log 
real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit indus-
try is delicensed in a particular year, and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded (1 
5 pro-worker, 0 5 neutral, 21 5 pro-employer) and then cumulated over the 194721997 period to generate the labor 
regulation measure. 1980 labor regulation is the labor regulation measure of states as of 1980. Instrumented labor regu-
lation is predicted from a state-year regression for 195821997 in which the instruments are interactions between a post-
1977 dummy variable and pre-1977 mean unionization in a state and between the post-1977 dummy and patterns of 
land tenure in British India 1 from Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer 20052 . The f-statistic for the significance of the 
excluded instruments in the first-stage state-year regression is 7.27. The Hansen-Sargan overidentification test regresses 
the residuals from the second-stage state-industry time regression on interactions between the instruments and deli-
cense. The instruments pass the overidentification test with a p-value of 0.255. Standard errors in column 3 are cor-
rected for instrumented labor regulation being generated in a first-stage regression. See the Data Appendix for further 
information on variable definitions and the data sources. * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** 
denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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A potential concern is that state labor regulations are responding to changes in industrial 
development following delicensing. Therefore, column 2 considers a specification where we 
interact delicense with state labor regulations in 1980 before delicensing occurred. State-level 
amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded and cumulated from 1947, so column 2 
examines whether pre-delicensing cross-state variation in labor regulation affected how indus-
tries responded to delicensing in subsequent years. The interaction coefficient continues to be 
negative and significant, and of similar magnitude to the column 1 result, indicating that indus-
tries located in states classified as pro-employer in 1980 tended to grow more quickly, relative to 
their counterparts in pro-worker states, after they were delicensed.
To provide further evidence against feedback from industrial development to labor regula-
tion, we exploit the instrumental variables estimation strategy of Besley and Burgess (2004). 
Following a Supreme Court ruling, which found Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party guilty of elec-
tion fraud, she imposed martial law and suspended elections between 1975 and 1977. When 
state elections resumed, she and her party were heavily punished—10 of the 16 states in our data 
switched from Congress to non-Congress majorities. The new governments brought new ideas, 
and we observe an increase in labor regulation activity following this political shock. We use 
interactions between a post-1977 dummy variable and pre-1977 mean unionization in a state and 
between the post-1977 dummy and patterns of land tenure in British India (from Banerjee and 
Iyer 2005) as our two instruments for state labor regulation. Unionization and historical land 
tenure both affected how politics had evolved in each state, and hence the direction of labor 
regulation when political competition intensified post-1977.
Our IV strategy is to predict labor regulation using a first-stage regression, which includes our 
two instruments, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects for the period 1958–1997.12 We then 
interact the predicted value of labor regulation with delicense and include it in our second-stage 
regression. The result is in column 3 of Table 3.13 The estimated coefficient on the delicense–
labor regulation interaction is of a similar magnitude to that in column 1 and statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level, supporting our interpretation of the interaction term as capturing the 
role of state-specific labor regulation in determining the heterogeneous impact of delicensing.
In column 4 we include a set of interactions between each state fixed effect and delicense. 
These interactions control for all fixed state characteristics that affect how industries respond to 
delicensing, including cross-state differences in labor regulation at the beginning of our sample 
period. The identification of the delicense–labor regulation interaction coefficient now solely 
comes from changes in labor regulation during the sample period. Even with this limited varia-
tion (see Figure A2 in the online Appendix), the coefficient remains negative and significant, 
indicating that, after being delicensed, industries located in states that moved in a pro-employer 
direction experienced greater output growth relative to those located in states that moved in a 
pro-worker direction.
When we reestimate the specification from column 1 of Table 3 for two alternative measures 
of industrial performance—total employment and fixed capital—we find similar magnitudes of 
interaction effects. The estimated delicense–labor regulation coefficients (standard errors) are 
20.050 (0.019) and 20.054 (0.020), respectively. Therefore, pro-worker states experience less 
employment growth and investment relative to pro-employer states following delicensing.
12 The f-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression is 7.27 (this is a state-year regression, 
with standard errors clustered on state), indicating that the instruments have some power in explaining the direction 
of labor regulation.
13 Standard errors in column 3 have been corrected to take account of the fact that predicted labor regulation is 
generated in a first-stage regression.
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Our results demonstrate that liberalization had unequal effects across Indian states, and accen-
tuated the importance of labor regulation in determining the trajectory of industrial activity in 
India. To gauge the economic significance of our findings we construct a counterfactual of what 
would have happened to the distribution of output across Indian states had delicensing had no 
heterogenous effects in states with different labor regulations. To do this, we first construct fitted 
values for log output using the specification in column 1 of Table 3. We next construct a coun-
terfactual series for log output without heterogeneous effects of delicensing (by falsely assuming 
that u 5 0 in column 1 of Table 3).14 Taking exponents and summing across industries within 
each state allows us to compare the evolution of state output with and without heterogeneous 
effects of delicensing (see Figure A3 in the online Appendix).
The largest relative increases in output following delicensing are found in Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu, the states with the most pro-employer labor regulations. Output in Andhra Pradesh 
and Tamil Nadu is around 10 percent higher in 1997 relative to the counterfactual. In contrast, 
output in West Bengal and Maharashtra, the states with the most pro-worker regulations, is 18 
percent and 9 percent lower, respectively. Similar results are found for employment and fixed 
capital.15
Collectively, these results paint a consistent picture. State labor regulations affected in a size-
able fashion the relative development of registered manufacturing across Indian states following 
the delicensing episodes of the 1980s and 1990s.
C. Robustness
Liberalization in 1991 in India came as a package. Trade tariffs were reduced and restrictions 
on foreign direct investment were relaxed at the same time that the second wave of delicensing 
was taking place. These reforms were enacted centrally and vary across industries and time (see 
Krishna and Mitra 1998; Topalova 2005). Table 4 checks whether our delicense–labor regulation 
result is robust to controlling for interactions between these other industry-year varying elements 
of the liberalization package and labor regulation.
We begin by examining the interaction between our tariff measure and labor regulation. In 
a specification with state-industry interactions and year dummies, this interaction is positive 
and significant, suggesting that tariff reductions led to output expansion in pro-employer states 
 relative to pro-worker states.16 This result, however, is not robust to controlling for industry-
year and state-year interactions, as is shown in column 1 of Table 4. In column 2, we include 
the interaction of labor regulation with both tariff and delicense alongside one another. The 
delicense–labor regulation interaction remains negative and significant (and of the same magni-
tude as in column 1 of Table 3), indicating robustness to controlling for the interaction of trade 
liberalization with labor regulation. When we include both FDI reform-labor regulation and tar-
iff-labor regulation interactions in column 3, we find that neither is significant. In column 4, we 
include our FDI reform measure interacted with labor regulation alongside the delicense–labor 
regulation and tariff–labor regulation interactions. We find that the delicense–labor regulation 
14 Since industry-year and state-year interaction effects absorb, respectively, the level effects of delicensing and 
labor regulation, the difference between the fitted and counterfactual series can identify only the heterogeneous effects 
of delicensing.
15 Our estimates imply that, relative to the counterfactual, employment in 1997 is 5 and 10 percent higher in Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, respectively, and 18 percent lower in West Bengal. Similarly, fixed capital is around 10 per-
cent higher in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and 19 percent lower in West Bengal.
16 See column 3 of Table A3 in the online Appendix. We also find a negative but statistically insignificant average 
effect of tariffs on output, which lines up with the weak direct effects of delicensing on output that we observe in Table 
2 (see column 2 of Table A3).
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interaction remains significant (and of similar magnitude to our earlier result from column 1 in 
Table 3). Our central finding is therefore robust to controlling for the interaction of both trade 
liberalization and FDI reform with labor regulation.
Table 5 checks whether our delicense–labor regulation result is robust to controlling for interac-
tions between delicensing and other time-varying state policies and characteristics. In column 1, 
we include the interaction of delicense with state development expenditure and with a measure of 
state financial development. Development expenditure includes state spending on health, educa-
tion, and infrastructure and helps crudely to measure differences in state government investment 
in these activities across time. For financial development, we use the instrumented state-level 
bank branch expansion measure from Burgess and Rohini Pande (2005). This captures the 
expansion of bank branch networks into locations with no banks across Indian states driven 
by the introduction (in 1977) and removal (in 1990) of a branch licensing rule.17 This mitigates 
concerns that financial development is endogenous to industrial development while controlling 
for this potentially important determinant of industrial performance (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
1997; Aghion, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes 2005; Kalina Manova 2006).
The coefficient on the delicense–development expenditure interaction in column 1 of Table 5 
is positive and significant, suggesting that within each industry, states with larger development 
expenditures tend to gain more from the delicensing reform relative to those that spend less. The 
17 Between 1977 and 1990, the Indian Central Bank imposed a licensing rule which required that for each branch 
opened in a location already served by a bank, four had to be opened in locations without a bank. Burgess and Pande 
(2005) use the number of bank branches per capita in 1961 interacted with (a) a post-1976 time trend and (b) a post-1989 
time trend as instruments for state-level bank branch expansion. Standard errors in columns 1 to 3 of Table 5 have been 
adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted financial development is generated in a first-stage regression.
Table 4—Trade Liberalization, FDI Reform, Labor Regulation, and Industrial Performance in India: 
1980–1997112 122 132 142
Log real output Log real output Log real output Log real output
Delicense 3 labor regulation 20.059** 20.059**10.0242 10.0242
Log tariff rate 3 labor regulation 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.00810.0192 10.0202 10.0192 10.0202
FDI reform 3 labor regulation 20.007 20.01010.0382 10.0362
Observations 17,783 17,783 17,783 17,783
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
State-industry interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dataset is a balanced panel of three-digit state industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and 
includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. The difference in the num-
ber of observations between Table 4 and Table 3 is due to the fact that there are a small number of three-digit indus-
tries for which tariff data are unavailable. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on state 3 year delicensed are 
reported in parentheses. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable 
which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year, and zero otherwise. State amend-
ments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded (1 5 pro-worker, 0 5 neutral and 21 5 pro-employer) and then cumu-
lated over the 1947–1997 period to generate the labor regulation measure. Log tariff rate is the log tariff rate applied to 
a three-digit industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the fraction 
of Harmonized System six-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of FDI for up to 
51 percent equity. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes sta-
tistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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delicense–financial development coefficient is also positive and significant, suggesting that states 
that expanded access to finance benefited from delicensing relative to those where bank branch 
expansion was less marked. The coefficient on the delicense–labor regulation interaction, how-
ever, remains negative and significant, and similar in magnitude to column 1 of Table 3, when 
we include these controls.
Labor market regulations may also be correlated with the technological level of industries in 
a given state. To address this concern, we construct a dummy for whether a state industry is in 
the top, middle, or bottom tercile of the cross-state distribution of labor productivity within the 
Table 5—Robustness to Interactions with State and State-Industry Characteristics112 122 132
Log real output Log real output Log real output
Delicense 3 labor regulation 20.051** 20.064** 20.064***10.0242 10.0282 10.0222
Delicense 3 log development exp 0.188* 20.113 20.11810.1052 10.1012 10.1262
Delicense 3 financial development 0.030** 0.029* 0.047**10.0142 10.0172 10.0232
Delicense 3 top industry productivity tercile 0.472*** 0.474***10.0322 10.0322
Delicense 3 bottom industry productivity tercile 20.521*** 20.523***10.0332 10.0332
Delicense 3 Congress majority 20.00610.0052
Delicense 3 hard-left majority 0.00510.0202
Delicense 3 regional majority 0.00310.0062
Delicense 3 janata majority 0.00610.0192
Delicense 3 hindu majority 0.07210.0812
Observations 18,324 18,324 18,324
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.93
State-industry interactions Yes Yes Yes
State-year interactions Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year interactions Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dataset is a balanced panel of three-digit state industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and 
includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on state 3 year delicensed are reported in parentheses. Log real output is log real registered 
manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed 
in a particular year, and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded (1 5 pro-worker, 0 
5 neutral and 21 5 pro-employer) and then cumulated over the 1947–1997 period to generate the labor regulation mea-
sure. Log development expenditure is real per capita state spending on social and economic services. Financial devel-
opment is from Burgess and Pande 120052 who use the number of bank branches per capita in 1961 interacted with 1a 2 a 
post-1976 time trend and 1b 2 a post-1989 time trend as instruments for state-level bank branch expansion for the 1961–
2000 period. We use predicted financial development from this state-year regression interacted with delicense above. 
The f-statistic for the significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage state-year regression is 16.87. Standard 
errors in columns 1 to 3 of Table 5 have been adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted financial development 
is generated in a first-stage regression. Top industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies 
in the top third of the cross-state within-industry labor productivity distribution in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Bottom industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies in the bottom third of the cross-
state within-industry labor productivity distribution in a given year, and zero otherwise. Congress, hard left, regional, 
Janata, and Hindu majority are counts of the number of years for which these political groupings held a majority of the 
seats in the state legislatures since 1957. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the 
data sources.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent 
level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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industry in a given year. We then interact the top and bottom tercile dummies with our delicense 
measure, omitting the middle tercile interaction which serves as a reference. In column 2 of 
Table 5 (which also contains the development expenditure and financial development controls 
from column 1), we see that being in the top tercile is associated with a larger increase in output 
after delicensing relative to being in the middle tercile.18 Being in the bottom tercile is associated 
with smaller increases. Both effects are large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. 
Technological level clearly has a bearing on which state-industries in a three-digit sector benefit 
from delicensing. Controlling for technology, however, has little effect on the delicense–labor 
regulation interaction term, which remains negative and significant and of similar magnitude to 
column 1 of Table 3. The direction of labor regulation in a state does not appear to be just proxy-
ing for how technologically advanced industries in a state are.
Many aspects of the policy environment are difficult to measure. In column 4 of Table 3, we 
have shown that our results are robust to including delicense-state interactions which control 
for the role that unobserved time-invariant state characteristics play in mediating the impact of 
delicensing. Omitted interactions between delicense and unobserved time-varying state policies, 
however, remain a concern. As a further robustness check, we therefore add in controls for the 
political complexion of states on the grounds that policy stances affecting the registered manu-
facturing sector are likely to be correlated with political outcomes. We expect past political out-
comes to matter, as they determine the attitude toward business that prevails in the bureaucracy 
and polity. This attitude will affect a range of policy actions that we cannot observe in our data. 
We therefore assemble a picture of each state’s “political history” as measured by the number of 
years since 1957 that particular political groupings have held a majority of the seats in the state 
legislature. The relevant groupings for this exercise are: the Congress Party, hard-left parties, 
regional parties, Janata parties, and Hindu parties. The results are in column 3, which also con-
tains the full set of controls for development expenditure, financial development, and technology 
from columns 1 and 2. The coefficient on the interaction between delicense and labor regulation 
remains negative and significant, and of similar magnitude to column 1 of Table 3 when we 
control for the interaction between delicense and state political histories. The same result holds 
if we use the contemporaneous share of seats held in state assemblies in these five groupings 
interacted with delicense.19
The timing of delicensing varies across industries. A natural question to ask is whether the 
actual year in which industries are delicensed matters. To investigate this, we run a Monte Carlo 
simulation in which we draw a random year when an industry is delicensed from the empirical 
distribution of delicensing years. We do this for each three-digit industry, thus creating a ran-
dom or “placebo” delicense measure. We repeat this process to generate 100 placebo delicense 
measures. For each of the placebo measures, the probability of an industry being delicensed in a 
given year matches that in the actual data, but we randomize over the identities of industries.
In a first falsification exercise, we then estimate our regression specification (1) using the 
placebo delicense measures in the place of our actual delicense measure. In 93 of the 100 
 regressions, we find that the placebo delicense–labor regulation interaction has a lower absolute 
18  This finding is consistent with the theory of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), who argue that the removal 
of entry barriers favors the performance of firms and industries that are closer to the technological frontier, while it may 
harm less advanced ones. See also Aghion and Rachel Griffith (2005) for corresponding UK evidence.
19  As part of a wider sensitivity analysis, not reported in the paper, we included all of the following additional 
variables interacted with delicense in columns 1 to 3 of Table 5: (a) the constituent health, education, and other expen-
diture elements of development expenditure (to more finely control for state-government spending behavior), (b) the 
proportion of people below the poverty line in a state (to capture overall backwardness), (c) state-specific differences 
between industrial and agricultural electricity tariffs (to capture cross-subsidization of agriculture), and (d) cumulative 
state land reform acts from Besley and Burgess (2000) (to capture how pro-rural a state was). In all these regressions, 
the delicense–labor regulation interaction remains negative and highly significant.
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t statistic than the actual delicense–labor regulation interaction (from column 1 of Table 3). 
In a second falsification exercise, we include both the actual and placebo delicense measures 
interacted with labor regulation in our regression specification (1). The actual delicense–labor 
regulation interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in 98 of the 100 regressions, whereas 
the placebo delicense–labor regulation interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in only 7 of 
the regressions. The results of both falsification exercises serve as compelling evidence that the 
actual timing of when industries are delicensed is central to our main empirical result.
A final concern is that the sequencing of delicensing may be driven by the underlying per-
formance of industries. The fact that delicensing was a centrally managed technocratic reform 
which was, in part, triggered by largely unexpected shocks (Rajiv Gandhi’s sudden rise to power 
and the IMF-imposed structural adjustment program under Narasimha Rao) helps to allay the 
concern that industries may have acted in anticipation of economic reforms. However, the indus-
tries that were delicensed in different waves may have been selected according to some charac-
teristics related to performance potential. In particular, reformers in 1985 may have not chosen 
industries randomly. The concern is less severe for the 1991 wave, as this covered most of the 
remaining industries, and the criterion for the exclusion of a few industries was their strategic, 
environmental, and social importance. Endogenous sequencing would be a problem for analyz-
ing the impact of delicensing if the selection criterion were correlated with the expected future 
performance of state-industries at the time of the reform.20 As a crude check on this, we ran a 
cross-section regression of the year in which a three-digit industry was delicensed on output 
growth in that industry during the 1980–1984 period (prior to the first wave of delicensing). This 
is intended to detect whether politicians selected industries in 1985 according to their degree of 
economic success. We find no evidence of a relationship between when an industry is delicensed 
and pre-reform output growth (the estimated coefficient of interest is 20.383, and the standard 
error is 1.436). Similar results are found using other measures of pre-reform industrial perfor-
mance, such as employment or labor productivity growth during 1980–1984.21 The absence of 
systematic differences in pre-reform economic performance between industries that are deli-
censed in each of the two waves is reassuring.
III.  Conclusions
This paper has investigated the extent to which the effects on registered manufacturing output 
of dismantling the License Raj—a system of central controls governing entry and expansion 
in this sector—vary across Indian states with different labor market regulations. To do this we 
employ a difference-in-difference econometric specification that includes state-industry, indus-
try-year, and state-year interactions to control for a variety of unobserved effects. The main find-
ing is that output rose more in pro-employer states than it did in pro-worker states in response to 
the same delicensing reform. This central result stands up to a wide variety of robustness checks 
and the delicense–labor regulation interaction coefficient is similar in size and significance 
across a range of specifications. Delicensing resulted in a sizeable reallocation of industrial pro-
duction from states with pro-worker labor institutions to states with pro-employer labor institu-
tions. A policy implication of our analysis is that liberalization tends to make the creation of a 
more favorable investment climate a more pressing concern. This may require complementary 
20 The fact that our interest centers on the delicense–labor regulation interaction helps somewhat in this regard. To 
explain our main result from column 1 of Table 3, endogenous selection would have to be based upon an industry’s 
expected strong performance in pro-employer states and/or expected weak performance in pro-worker states.
21 The regression coefficients (standard errors) are, respectively, 0.23 (1.25) and 20.74 (1.57).
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institutional reforms as well as redistributive policies that ease the costs of adjustment associated 
with liberalization.
Data Appendix
Our dataset on output, number of factories, employment, and fixed capital covers an average 
of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 main Indian states over an 18-year time period from 1980 
to 1997 and comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).22 To this dataset we add the fol-
lowing variables.
Delicense.—Appendix II of the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 reports 
a comprehensive list of the “Scheduled Industries” subject to industrial licensing (Malik 1997). 
All key manufacturing sectors are covered by the 1951 act. We assigned three-digit codes to 
the scheduled industries listed in the act and used Press Notices and Notifications issued by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to track when three-digit industries were delicensed 
during the 1980s (see Shri Chaudhary 1987; Government of India’s Economic Surveys, and the 
Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics 1987). The Statement of Industrial Policy of 1991 
disbanded industrial licensing except for a small number of specified industries. Subsequent 
revisions to the list of licensed industries from 1991 onward were tracked from Press Notices and 
Notifications published in various issues of the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics.
Labor Regulation.—This measure is based on state-specific text amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act 1947 reported in Malik (1997). Our coding of amendments follows Besley and 
Burgess (2004): 0 denotes a change judged not to affect the bargaining power of either workers 
or employers, 1 is a pro-worker change, and 21 denotes a pro-employer change. Where there was 
more than one amendment in a year, we code the net direction of change, thus restricting our 
measure to take a value of 0, 1, 21 in any given state and year. These measures are then cumu-
lated over the 1947–1997 period.
Tariffs and fDI Reform.—Data on actual rates of duty are from the Customs Tariff of India 
manuals published through the Central Board of Excise and Customs. Prior to 1988, the basic, 
auxiliary, and countervailing duties are reported for approximately 1,100 products of the Brussels 
Tariff Nomenclature (BTN). From 1988 onward, even more finely detailed data are available for 
approximately 5,000 six-digit products of the Harmonized System (HS). We combine the three 
rates of duty according to the official formula23 and then aggregate product rates to the three-
digit industry average using the mapping of Bibek Debroy and A. T. Santhanam (1993). Data on 
when different HS six-digit products are opened to automatic FDI approval for up to 51 percent 
of equity are from the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics.
Control Variables.—State development expenditure is from the Public Finance Statistics pub-
lished by the Ministry of Finance. Our measure of state financial development is from Burgess 
and Pande (2005). The data on political histories come from state election data published by the 
Election Commission of India. State poverty head counts are from the National Sample Survey. 
State cumulative land reforms are from Besley and Burgess (2000). Agricultural and industry 
22 The Indian industrial classification changes in 1987. We establish a concordance from the 1970 classification 
to the 1987 classification to create a consistent state-industry panel across the 1980–1997 period (see Table A2 in the 
online Appendix).
23 Applied tariff 5 basic 1 auxiliary 1 1100 1 basic 1 auxiliary 2 3 1countervailing 2/100. 
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electricity tariff data come from Annual Reports on the Working of State Electricity Boards and 
Electricity Departments.
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